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Washington, D.C.
May 17, 1983
My name is Allan Hunt. I am Acting Manager of Research at the W. E. Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research in Kalamazoo, Michigan. The Upjohn Institute 
is an endowed, nonprofit organization that has been engaged in conducting and 
publishing policy-oriented research in the broad areas of employment and 
unemployment since 1945.
We have just completed a project on the employment implications of 
robotics. It was initiated at the request of the Michigan Occupational 
Information Coordinating Committee and reflected the keen interest within the 
State of Michigan in robots and their employment impacts. My colleague Timothy 
Hunt and I spent the last 13 months examining the employment impacts of 
robotics and have just published a book relating the results of that research. 
I will be drawing .freely from this volume in my testimony today.
What is the essence of our findings? We believe the robots are coming; not 
as rapidly as anticipated by some nor with the devastating impact predicted by 
others, but they are coming. Furthermore, we all have a stake in the impending 
change, at least to the extent that robots will be part of a movement to raise 
the productivity of American factories and retain the competitiveness of 
American goods on national and international markets. We argue that robots 
should be regarded simply as another labor-saving technology, one more step in 
a process that has been going on for some 200 years.
Before proceeding it is necessary to put the so-called "robotics 
revolution" into some perspective. There are precious little hard data about 
industrial robots today. Most of the public awareness of robots has been 
shaped by the hyperbole in the popular press. Futurists and others compete for 
media attention with wild projections of the impacts of robotics--800,000 
people making robots, 1.5 million technicians maintaining robots, and millions 
of workers displaced with little or no consideration of the practical issues 
involved. We believe the intense media attention on robotics in the past year 
or so has seriously confused the issues.
First, we submit that the very use of the word "revolution" is 
inappropriate when dealing with any manufacturing process technology. Capital 
goods for production have long lives and are not scrapped immediately when 
something better comes along. Numerically controlled machine tools, usually 
regarded as the capital equipment most closely related to robots, expanded at a 
growth rate of only 12 percent for the most recent ten-year period. After 25 
years, only 3 to 4 percent of all metalcutting machine tools are numerically 
controlled. Even digital computers, widely heralded as the most significant 
technological innovation of the 1960s and 1970s, expanded at a growth rate of 
only 25 percent (excluding microcomputers for home market). Yet many are 
implicitly assuming much higher growth rates for industrial robots. In terms 
of actual application, process technology changes tend to be evolutionary 
rather than revolutionary because of the physical, financial and human 
constraints on the rate of change of process technology.
Second, the fear of massive unemployment caused by the introduction of 
industrial machinery appears to be unfounded historically. Such fears began 
with the dawn of the industrial era in the 1700s. They are particularly acute 
during major recessions. For example, the "automation" problem was of urgent 
national concern in the early 1960s after a halting recovery from the sharp 
recession of 1958-59. There were grim predictions that automation was causing 
permanent unemployment in the auto industry and other industries. A national 
commission was appointed to study the problem and in 1966, with the economy 
near full employment, the commission rendered its final report. They concluded 
that a sluggish economy was the major cause of unemployment rather than 
automation.
Third, there appears to be a fundamental lack of understanding that the 
association of technological change, economic growth, and job displacement is 
not just a coincidence; they are intertwined and inseparable. That is not to 
imply that adoption of new technologies necessarily insures economic growth, or 
that displaced workers will always find new jobs. However, it does mean that 
we all have a vital stake in productivity gains (i.e., in displacing jobs) 
because that is what allows the possibility of rising real incomes. The price 
of a growing, dynamic economy that makes more goods and services available to 
all of us is job displacement, or the elimination of jobs through technological 
change.
In our book we assess the direct impact of robots on the employment picture 
in the U.S. and Michigan between now and 1990. Our data were gathered from 
published sources and through interviews with robot manufacturers, robot users, 
and other experts. Still, it was necessary to resort to considerable 
projection and estimation. This creates the opportunity to be extravagant, but 
we tried to avoid this. We selected the conservative, but realistic 
alternative wherever there was a choice. All judgments and assumptions are 
explicitly 'stated in the full monograph. Due to the space limitations here, 
however, the emphasis is on conclusions rather than methodology.
U.S. Robot Population
The projections of occupational impact in our research are the result of 
first forecasting the U.S. robot population by industry and application areas. 
This approach constrains the employment impacts to reflect the actual expected
sales of robots. In this way a consistent economic framework is established 
within which it is possible to estimate not only the population of robots and 
job displacement but also the job creation resulting therefrom. This 
consistency is also very helpful in avoiding unrealistic or exaggerated 
conclusions. Table 1 shows our robot population forecast for 1990.
We expect strong growth in the utilization of industrial robots in the 
decade of the 1980s. We forecast that the total robot population in the U.S. 
by 1990 will range from a minimum of 50,000 to a maximum of 100,000 units. 
Given our estimate of the year-end 1982 population of approximately 7,000 
units, that implies an average annual growth rate of between 30 and 40 percent 
for the eight years of the forecast period, or roughly a seven to fourteenfold 
increase in the total population of robots. As shown in Table 2, our forecast 
tends to be on the conservative side compared to other published estimates. 
However, the upper end of our range is generally consistent with other 
forecasts.
Our projected range is intended to contain the actual robot population with 
a high probability level, and allows for variation in interest rates, capital 
investment climate, auto industry recovery, and rate of economic growth. We 
are confident this range will contain the 1990 robot population. That means we 
do not expect developments such as the total collapse of the automobile 
industry, a major renaissance in U.S. capital investment, the early development 
of a significant number of nonmanufacturing robot applications, or the 
widespread adoption of robotics technology by small firms.
The U.S. population of robots is developed separately for the auto industry 
and all other manufacturing. This is partly to take advantage of the fact that 
the auto producers have announced goals for robot installations which could be 
factored into our robot population forecast. It also reflects the fact that 
the major impact of robots in the State of Michigan will be in the auto 
industry. Our forecast sees 15,000 to 25,000 robots employed in the U.S. auto 
industry by 1990. If the auto firms were to exactly meet their announced 
plans, there would be approximately 20,000 robots in U.S. auto plants by 1990.
Job Displacement
Utilizing the robot forecast by industry, and the assumption of a gross 
displacement rate of two jobs per robot which was strongly supported in our 
interviews, estimates of gross job displacement (the elimination of job tasks 
rather than actual layoffs of workers) can be derived. We estimate that robots 
in the U.S. will eliminate between 100,000 and 200,000 jobs by 1990. from 
30,000 to 50,000 of these will be in the auto industry, while 70,000 to 150,000 
jobs in other manufacturing industries will also be eliminated.
In addition to the assignment of robots by industry, it was necessary to 
forecast the applications for which they will be used. This is required if the 
robot population forecast is to be useful in predicting occupational 
displacement. Otherwise there is no way to connect the robots with the work 
content of specific jobs. The application areas used in our research are 
welding, assembly, painting, machine loading and unloading, and other.
When the robot forecast by application area and industry is matched against 
an occupational data base similarly organized, specific occupational 
displacement rates can be estimated. These results are shown in Table 3. 
Although the maximum overall job displacement rate in manufacturing of 1 
percent through 1990 is not particularly problematical, specific industry and 
occupation displacement rates are very significant, even dramatic.
To begin with, the displacement rate derived for the auto industry ranged 
from 4 to 6 percent of all employment. But when displacement was calculated 
only against the production workers in the auto industry, the magnitude of 
displacement was from 6 to 11 percent. Even when considered to be over a 
period of a decade, these rates of job displacement are significant.
When specific occupational displacement rates are calculated, even more 
striking results emerge. Our results suggest that between 15 and 20 percent of 
the welders in the auto industry will be displaced by robots by 1990. Even 
more dramatically, between 27 and 37 percent of the production painter jobs in 
the auto industry will be eliminated by 1990. While displacement results are 
generally less significant for specific occupations in all other manufacturing, 
it is projected that 7 to 12 percent of the production painter jobs there will 
be lost in the same time frame.
The conclusion of the job displacement estimates is that while job 
displacement due to robots will not be a general problem before 1990, there 
will clearly be particular areas that will be significantly affected. Chief 
among these will be the painting and welding jobs for which today's robots are 
so well adapted. Lesser impacts will be apparent on metalworking machine 
operatives and assemblers. Geographically, states such as Michigan, especially 
the southeastern quadrant with its heavy dependence on autos, will suffer 
greater displacement than other states or regions.
We do not believe that this job displacement will lead to widespread job 
loss among the currently employed, however. Table 4 compares the average 
annual rates of displacement by occupation with the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
estimates of average annual replacement needs and total job openings for the 
same occupational groups. Clearly, the job displacement which can be expected 
is much less than the occupational replacement needs for the foreseeable 
future. Even in the auto industry, voluntary turnover rates historically have 
been sufficient to handle the reduction in force that might be required. In 
addition, the new General Motors-United Auto Workers contract, as one example, 
seems to provide adequate job security assurances, and the retraining 
commitment necessary to back them up. Thus we do not expect any substantial 
number of auto workers to be thrown out of work due to the application of 
robots. Any unemployment impact is likely to be felt by the unskilled labor 
market entrants who will find more and more factory gates closed to the new 
employee. Therefore, if there is an increase in unemployment as a result of 
the spread of robotics technology, we fear the burden will fall on the less 
experienced, less well educated part of our labor force.
Job Creation
Turning our attention to the job creation issue, we forecast the direct 
creation of about 32,000 to 64,000 jobs in the U.S. by 1990 in four broad
areas: robot manufacturing, direct suppliers to robot manufacturers, robot 
systems engineering, and corporate robot users. The jobs in corporate robot 
users identify maintenance requirements for robots, while the jobs in robot 
systems engineering identify the applications engineering requirements for 
robot systems, without regard to industry of employment.
In these projections we assumed that the status quo would be maintained in 
both the import and export markets for robots, primarily because of a lack of 
any better information. But there is certainly no guarantee that U.S. 
producers will maintain their share of the national or worldwide market. This 
threat is especially menacing because of Japanese and European expertise in 
robotics technology.
The projections of robot-related job creation by occupation are very 
speculative because of the limited experience to date with robots and the 
uncertainties involved in predicting the future occupational profiles of firms 
that do not yet exist. However, the high technical component of labor demand 
is quite startling. It can be seen from Table 5 that well over half of the 
jobs created will require two or more years of college training.
The largest single occupational group of jobs created by robotics will be 
robotics technicians. This is a term which is just coming into general usage; 
it refers to an individual with the training or experience to test, program, 
install, troubleshoot, or maintain industrial robots. We anticipate that most 
of the new entrants to this occupation will be trained in community college 
programs of two years duration. We project that jobs for about 12,000 to 
25,000 robotics technicians will be created in the U.S. by 1990. We do not 
anticipate a supply problem for robotics technicians, as the community college 
system gives every indication that they will be ready and willing to train 
whatever numbers are needed. In fact, our current concern is that they may, in 
some instances, be increasing the supply too rapidly.
Specifically, a continuation of the expansion of the last year or so in 
course offerings and enrollments in robotics technician programs on a national 
scale will very quickly swamp the ability of the industry to absorb trained 
people. There may already be as many students enrolled in these programs as 
there are annual sales of robots. For that reason, we endorse careful 
attention to the breadth of training. A firm grounding in theory and general 
principles of electronics, controls, hydraulics, etc. will stand the graduates 
of such programs in good stead whether they actually work primarily with robots 
or not.
In the auto industry, we expect the robot maintenance requirement will 
continue to be met by the members of the UAW Skilled Trades Council. General 
Motors already has agreed to a retraining effort in excess of $80 million 
annually. We believe the strong implication of the contractual arrangements is 
that auto industry employers will not be required to hire from the outside to 
meet their robotics technician needs. Other major robot users may follow the 
lead of the auto industry, but it is impossible to predict that with assurance 
at this early date.
There also will be a relatively large number of graduate engineers needed 
to implement the expansion of robotics technology in U.S. industry. We
estimated the requirement from about 4,600 to 9,300 new engineers. While these 
numbers are comparatively small, only one-fifth of one year's production of 
engineers at the baccalaureate level, there is already a clear shortage of 
engineers, so we start from a deficit position. In addition, we face the 
challenge of other likely engineering demand increases as well as the 
historical instability of engineering enrollments. Thus it is quite likely 
that a shortage of engineers could compromise the expansion of robotics 
technology. Thus we add our voices to those calling for immediate national 
attention to the supply of engineers.
The most remarkable thing about the job displacement and job creation 
impacts of industrial robots is not the fact that more jobs are eliminated than 
created; this follows from the fact that robots are labor-saving technology 
designed to raise productivity and lower costs of production. Rather, it is 
the skill-twist that emerges so clearly when the jobs eliminated are compared 
to the jobs created. The jobs eliminated are semi-skilled or unskilled, while 
the jobs created require significant technical background. We submit that this 
is the true meaning of the so-called robotics revolution.
Policy Implications
We suspect that these research results on the impact of robotics can be 
generalized to other so-called "high-tech" areas. Data Resources, Inc. (DRI) 
has produced a forecast for Business Week of the employment potential of the 92 
SIC codes labeled high technology or high-tech-intensive by the BLS. For the 
period 1983 to 1993, DRI projects 730,000 to 1 million jobs will be created in 
this sector. This is about half the decline in manufacturing employment we 
have suffered in the past three years due to the recession.
The most fundamental reason these high-tech employment areas will not 
dominate in the near future is because they are so small now. We estimate 
there are only 5,000 to 6,000 people employed in robotics today; only about 
2,000 of these in robot manufacturing. The situation is similar for other 
emerging high technology industries. "High-tech hysteria" notwithstanding, we 
are confident that there will be more jobs created in Michigan by economic 
recovery than by high technology for at least the next decade.
We also believe, however, that the changes created by the introduction of 
the microprocessor to U.S. manufacturing in the future will alter the 
occupational content of the demand for labor. This will not happen overnight; 
it will be an evolutionary change. In fact, the skill-twist in the U.S. 
economy has been occurring over the past 40 years or so. We believe there will 
be less and less opportunity for employment by the unskilled or the 
semi-literate in our economy in the future. Thus while robotics and the other 
new manufacturing technologies do not create an immediate human resource 
problem, over time they will add to our existing problem; an oversupply of 
unskilled labor relative to demand.
When the Manpower Development and Training Act was passed by the Congress 
in 1962, it was designed primarily to attack the problem of technological 
unemployment. But as Willard Wirtz (Secretary of Labor, 1961-1969) puts it, we 
quickly discovered we were working on the wrong woodpile. We did not have a 
fundamental need for retraining of workers whose skills had been rendered
obsolete by automation; we faced a growing pool of labor (especially 
disadvantaged youth) who had never acquired any skills in the first place.
Similarly in 1983, we believe the prophets of high-tech hysteria are 
fundamentally misdiagnosing the problem. We do not have an enormous displaced 
worker problem, if by that term one refers to workers who had good jobs with 
substantial seniority who have been permanently separated from their employer. 
The truly displaced workers, in our opinion, are those involved in plant 
closing situations, not simple layoff due to lagging sales. We need a coherent 
human resource policy to deal with the very difficult problems associated with 
plant closure. Hopefully the JTPA displaced worker program will evolve in that 
direction as local decision-makers implement actual programs.
We believe a major share of what is popularly labeled the displaced or 
dislocated worker problem is purely cyclical and will disappear with an 
adequate economic recovery. The truly structural problems will remain, 
however, in the face of a job market which will increasingly require 
significant skills for entry level employment.
Historically in the United States, we have followed a market allocation 
strategy for human resources. Individuals prepare themselves for the job 
market as they see fit. Even though substantial public subsidies may be 
involved, there has not been any effective planning or coordination involved. 
We allow students to choose their own careers with minimal constraints and only 
the vaguest informational support. It is not necessary to abandon this 
non-system, but it is necessary to make it more efficient in the task of 
allocating scarce resources. Human resource decisions made by individuals can 
be made more effective with the provision of up-to-date and reliable labor 
market information. In addition, many youth have not made any decision, but 
simply followed the path of least resistance. Increasingly this path will lead 
to a dead end.
We cannot perfectly anticipate future occupational needs in great detail. 
It would be difficult in a planned economy; it is impossible in a market 
economy. There are too many influences on market events to make them 
predictable in advance. We can, however, improve our efforts to provide 
intelligence about general trends and to project their direction. The problem 
has been that there was no adequate data base with which to discern trends as 
they emerged. Until very recently we were dependent on decennial census data 
for detail on the occupational content of our economy. Measurements ten years 
appart are simply not sufficient to the task, especially when the method of 
classification was changed with each observation as well.
I believe that the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) survey program 
can provide an adequate remedy to this lack of information, if appropriately 
funded and developed. This would include not only the data gathering and 
analysis (which must be speeded up greatly if its usefulness is to be 
maximized) but the dissemination of the information to individual decision- 
makers. At a minimum, we need national projections and local data bases 
sufficient to make the local implications of the larger picture apparent.
The evidence on the performance of job search skills training, job clubs, 
and the like is sufficient to convince me that there are very significant
frictional barriers to employment for some. An improved labor market 
information system is requisite to better performance in this area. In 
addition, an adequate up-to-date data base for local labor market areas would 
be of inestimable assistance for planning JTPA and other local training 
efforts. Such a data base must have sufficient occupational detail to make it 
useful in projecting the need for particular skills, but not so much detail 
that it is confusing. Again, the OES data base possesses considerable promise 
as a prototype for this effort.
In addition, I believe we must provide a better educational opportunity in 
the first instance, and move to insure that our youth take advantage of this 
opportunity. We must upgrade our science and technology training all along the 
educational continuum. We need a new national effort similar to the National 
Defense Education Act to upgrade preparation for the world of work. We also 
need the techniques and the resources to insure that all our youth acquire some 
useful human capital. At a minimum, we should make sure that they have 
sufficient skills so that they can be retrained someday, if necessary. This 
means basic skills like reading, writing and arithmetic. I would favor 
competency-based standards in these areas for high school graduation.
One hopeful element here is the development of computerized individualized 
instructional systems in the last few years. Such systems would seem to offer 
great potential for teaching a large number of skills in non-classroom 
environments. There should be more effort directed to developing and 
implementing such systems. They would of course be useful for displaced 
workers as well. General Motors has found the Plato system, for example, very 
useful in retraining older workers who do not adapt well to a traditional 
classroom environment.
It does not make sense that we offer special tax incentives for physical 
capital formation only. If one wishes to make an investment in physical 
capital today, there are investment tax credits, rapid depreciation through the 
accelerated cost recovery system, and other public subsidies available. But if 
one wants to invest in one's own human capital, it is only deductible if it is 
required as minimal preparation for the job now held. If an individual wishes 
to improve his/her position, s/he must bear the full private cost of such 
investment. This is illogical and counterproductive. Individuals and firms 
should receive tax credit subsidies to encourage private investment in human 
capital. This simple step would signal the social interest in such investment 
and help offset the rising cost of education due to declining direct public 
subsidies.
Hopeful Signs for the Future
I would like to conclude my testimony by citing some developments that have 
occurred or are about to occur that promise some relief from our current 
situation. First, and most important, I believe the signs are now unmistakable 
that the bottom of the recession is behind us and economic conditions will be 
improving. Approximately 15 percent of the 1 aid-off auto workers have already 
been recalled and I believe the prospects are good for further recalls. 
Interest rates are down, prices are not up substantially, and tastes seem to be 
changing back to larger cars in the wake of stabilized oil prices.
Second, the demographic trends in the next decade appear to be favorable 
for reducing the additions to the labor force. While the number of youth (ages 
16-24) in the labor force increased by 54 percent from 1960 to 1970 and 38 
percent from 1970 to 1980, this component will actually decrease by 14 percent 
in the decade of the 1980s. If we can insure that a large proportion of youth 
entering the labor force in the '80s are prepared for the world of work, we may 
be able to keep from adding to the existing unemployment problem.
Third, there is widespread evidence of recognition that we have some 
significant human resource problems. The recent Commission report on the 
quality of our educational effort is but the latest example. There has been 
dissatisfaction with our educational performance from a number of 
perspectives. Perhaps this report will help bring the debate to a policy 
decision.
Last, there is at least a chance that the increasing incidence of 
labor-management cooperation in the last few years may be permanent. This is 
significant because of the potential productivity improvement that can 
accompany increased cooperation between management and labor. Japanese workers 
may not work any harder or any smarter than American workers, but everyone 
seems to agree they do work more cooperatively.
Ultimately, there is only one satisfactory solution to the high cost of 
labor in the U.S. since this is also the basis for the American standard of 
living. That solution lies in the productivity of our human resources. If we 
are to continue to be paid more than workers in other countries, we must 
produce more than they do. Careful management of our human resources is the 
only way I know to accomplish that.
Thank you for your attention.
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Table 2
Selected Estimates of 1990 Sales, Population 





































NOTE: The 1980-90 annual growth rate and the cumulative population in 1990 are not 
necessarily stated directly in all of these studies but can be calculated from data that are 
provided.
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Table 3
Displacement Impact of Robots in the United States 



































































SOURCE: Employment data based upon unpublished OES data provided by Office of Economic Growth and Employment Projections, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington. DC.
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Table 4
Displacement Impacts of Robots 
Compared to BLS Estimates of Job Openings
Simple average annual 




















































SOURCE: Replacement needs and lolal average annual openings from The National Industry-Occupation Employment Matrix, 1970-1978, and 
Projected 1990, U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Bulletin 2086, Vol. 2, April 1981, pp. 495-502. 
 Assuming maximum growth in robot population.
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Table 5
Direct Job Creation in U.S. 
Due to Robotics, by Occupation, 1990
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Skilled craft and related workers
Semi-skilled metalworking operatives
Assemblers and all other operatives
Service workers
Laborers
Total
4,636
12,284
664
936
1,583
581
2,908
2,163
2,153
3,763
138
279
32,088
9,272
24,568
1,328
1,871
3,166
1,162
5,817
4,326
4,306
7,526
276
558
64,176
